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AbSTRACT: As the United States resumes debate over options for achieving universal health 
coverage, policymakers are once again examining insurance systems in other industrialized countries. 
More recent attention has focused on countries that combine universal coverage with private 
insurance and regulated market competition. Switzerland and the Netherlands, in particular, have 
drawn attention for their use of individual mandates combined with public oversight of insurance 
markets. This paper provides an overview of the Swiss and Dutch insurance systems, which embody 
some of the same concepts that have guided health reforms adopted in Massachusetts and considered 
by other states and by federal policymakers. The two systems have many features in common: an 
individual mandate, standardized basic benefits, a tightly regulated insurance market, and funding 
schemes that make coverage affordable for low- and middle-income families. Differences include 
degree of centralization, basis of competition among insurers, availability of managed care, and 
reliance on patient cost-sharing to influence care-seeking behavior.
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FOREWORD
As the United States resumes active debate over options for achieving universal 
health coverage, policymakers are once again examining insurance systems in other 
industrialized countries. In the past, discussion often focused on the merits or deficiencies 
of single-payer social insurance models, such as Canadian or French approaches, or 
public systems. More recently, attention has turned to countries that combine universal 
coverage with private insurance and regulated market competition. The systems in 
Switzerland and the Netherlands, in particular, have drawn attention for their use of 
individual mandates combined with public oversight of insurance markets. Prepared 
at the request of the Swiss and Dutch national governments, this paper provides an 
overview of the Swiss and Dutch health insurance systems with a focus on insurance 
markets. The health insurance systems in the Netherlands and Switzerland embody some 
of the same concepts that have guided the health reforms adopted in Massachusetts and 
that have been considered in other states and at the federal level. Differences as well 
as similarities in core policies thus provide potential insights for the United States and 
international opportunities to learn, as the countries pursue shared goals of universal 
access, improved quality, and improved cost performance. 
Universal coverage attained through a mandate that every individual purchase a •	
basic insurance plan.
Building on a previous system of social and private insurance, the individual man-
date in the Netherlands took effect in 2006. The Swiss have operated with a man-
date since 1996. In both countries uninsured rates are low (estimated at about 1.5 
percent of the population in the Netherlands and below 1 percent in Switzerland). 
An additional 1.5 percent is insured but behind on premium payments—a policy 
concern in both countries. Both countries subsidize premiums for low-income 
households, with about 40 percent receiving such premium assistance. 
National standards for basic coverage for private insurance.•	
In both countries, benefits are comprehensive in scope for acute care services 
(doctors, hospitals, prescription drugs, and lab/diagnostic tests). Insurance 
systems bring the working-age and elderly populations into a single pool.
Switzerland imposes much higher cost-sharing, including deductibles and 
coinsurance. The Netherlands has notably low cost-sharing, with additional 
protections for the chronically ill. 
viii
In both countries, the majority of the population buys supplemental policies, 
often purchased from the insurer providing basic coverage. Insurers providing 
supplemental coverage are subject to fewer (Netherlands) or no (Switzerland) 
risk-rating restrictions. This has had complex effects on competition and mobility 
of the insured in the supplemental insurance market. 
Tight regulation of basic health insurance markets, with requirements for open  •	
enrollment and community rating.  
Both countries require that insurers accept all applicants and prohibit variations 
in premiums by health status—community rating, with guaranteed offer and re-
newal. The two countries differ markedly, however, regarding insurance market 
oversight, the way premiums are set, and the extent of risk equalization efforts 
across competing plans.
The Netherlands operates a national insurance market for its 16 million residents. 
Plans may operate on a for-profit or nonprofit basis. The insurance market 
is highly concentrated, with the top five plans accounting for 82 percent of 
enrollment. Plans typically offer coverage in all areas of the country and include 
all providers, although selective contracting is allowed. Children are covered in 
full through public funds. Premiums charged for adults represent 50 percent of the 
expected annual costs. In addition, plans receive allotments from a national risk 
equalization fund, financed by income-related contributions. The allocation uses a 
sophisticated range of risk factors. As a result of this process, the premiums facing 
Dutch adults when selecting a plan vary within a narrow range. 
In contrast, the Swiss insurance system (7.5 million people) is highly 
decentralized, with plans operating and setting premiums at the canton level  
(26 divisions). In Switzerland, only nonprofit insurers may participate. The 10 
largest of some 85 carriers insure 80 percent of the population. Swiss insurance 
risk equalization efforts adjust only for age and sex factors at the moment. 
Currently, Swiss premiums vary widely by health risks of insured pools across  
the country and within regions.
Since 2006, premium competition in the Netherlands has been vigorous, with 
carriers accepting initial losses under the new system to build market share. Both 
Dutch and Swiss insurance systems operate with relatively low overhead costs  
by U.S. standards: administrative and profit-margins account for about 5 percent 
of premiums. 
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Risk equalization systems are intended to reduce incentives for insurers to seek •	
healthier enrollees.
In both countries, funds are redistributed among insurers on the basis of measures 
of population need. The measures in the Netherlands have grown steadily more 
sophisticated and have proven better able to predict utilization than the simpler 
system adopted in Switzerland by the government. As a result, differences in 
insurer prices in Switzerland often reflect levels of enrollee risk, rather than 
relative efficiency. It is expected that the modification of the risk formula in 2012 
will substantially reduce these differences.
Use of managed care plans and selective provider contracting•	 .
In Switzerland, 12 percent of the population is enrolled in HMOs or other 
managed care plans. However, savings have been limited because most of these 
enrollees are in the least integrated plans, and plans have no ability to negotiate 
prices with providers. Outside such plans, Swiss patients have open access to 
physicians and can self-refer to specialists. Swiss provider fees are generally 
set by negotiations between provider associations and insurance associations. 
Hospitals are mostly paid per diem rates, although a large fraction has already 
changed to prospective reimbursement. A nationwide diagnosis-related group 
(DRG) system (SwissDRG) will be introduced in 2012. Cantons finance more 
than 50 percent of hospital costs either directly or through DRGs. 
The Netherlands has historically had a strong primary care system that required 
primary care referrals for specialized care. The 2006 insurance reform maintained 
this provision. It also enabled selective contracting and payment variations to 
improve cost and outcome performance. These arrangements are just beginning 
to emerge in the Netherlands. Hospital budgets and physician payments have 
historically been tightly regulated. To promote this development of payment 
innovation and more integrated systems, the scope of services for which plans 
may negotiate prices is gradually being expanded. 
The Dutch health insurance system is a work in progress, with the 2006 universal 
coverage law just the latest in a series of gradual reforms overseeing regulated insurance 
markets. This process has required consensus and ongoing commitment by successive 
governments to a basic framework for health reform. The Swiss program has been in 
place since 1996. Some of its shortcomings, in areas such as risk adjustment and provider 
contracting, have proved difficult to address, in part because of split responsibilities for 
health care under Switzerland’s federal system of government. This may have important 
ximplications in considering the right balance of federal and state responsibilities in health 
reform in the United States.
Despite the challenges, both systems can boast many successes as well. Both have 
achieved universal health coverage among their citizenry, with patient choice, broad access, 
and low disparities. Residents in both countries enjoy among the longest life expectancies 
in the world (Switzerland is second only to Japan), and both systems have wide support 
of the citizenry. These achievements highlight the potential value of investigating the  
experiences of both countries.
The Swiss and Dutch health systems provide real-world prototypes for a regulated 
competitive model with multiple insurance plans, which many believe is the most likely 
route to universal coverage in the United States. Both countries’ systems are in transition, 
with ongoing reforms focused on improving cost and quality performance. Tracking and 
understanding their experiences—both challenges and successes—offers potential insights 
for U.S. policymakers.
1THE SWISS AND DUTCH HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS: 
UNIVERSAL COVERAGE AND REGULATED  
COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKETS
INTRODUCTION
The health insurance systems in Switzerland and the Netherlands provide universal 
coverage through multiple private insurers in regulated competitive markets. The systems 
have many features in common: an individual mandate, standardized basic benefits, a 
tightly regulated insurance market, and funding schemes that make coverage affordable 
for low- and middle-income families. At the same time, there are important differences 
between the two systems, such as the degree of centralization, the basis of competition 
among insurers, the availability of managed care, and the extent to which they rely on 
patient cost-sharing to influence participants’ care-seeking behavior.
In the hope that each country could learn from the other’s experience, teams 
of health policy analysts were brought together at the request of the Dutch Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sports, the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health, and the Swiss Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs. The result of this unique effort to provide a compari-
son of the two systems using a common analytic framework is the 2008 report, The Swiss 
and the Dutch Health Care Systems Compared: A Tale of Two Systems.1
This summary report is an abridgment of that comprehensive volume. It begins 
with an overview of the two systems, followed by a more detailed account of specific 
aspects. An appendix provides data on how the systems compare to those in the United 
States and other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) on dimensions of cost, access, and patient satisfaction. Note that the dis-
cussion in this report is limited to coverage of acute care services. The Netherlands has 
a separate universal national social insurance program for long-term care, the AWBZ. 
Switzerland’s public funding for long-term care is more limited and financed at the level 
of cantons (equivalent to states), with responsibility split among health insurers, means-
tested public assistance, and payments by individuals.
SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The Swiss System
Since 1996, the Swiss system has operated under a Health Insurance Law intended to 
improve access and affordability of care and to contain costs. All residents are required 
1 The full volume is available from Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany,  
www.nomos-shop.de.
2to purchase basic health coverage from one of a number of competing private insurers 
operating under market rules set by the social insurance law. Insurers must be nonprofit 
organizations and must accept all applicants during specified open-enrollment periods 
with community-rated premiums. About 12 percent of enrollees are in some form of 
managed care, chiefly fee-for-service plans with a primary care gatekeeping feature 
(BAG 2007).
Within national guidelines and federal funding support, the Swiss insurance sys-
tem operates at the canton level (26 divisions), with insurance policies for basic cover-
age covering care within the region. Most Swiss also obtain supplementary coverage for 
services excluded from the basic package. This supplemental coverage primarily enables 
access to services outside their canton, private rooms, choice of doctor in hospitals, and 
extra benefits such as dental.
Basic plans have minimum deductible and coinsurance requirements; enrollees 
may opt for a higher deductible and obtain a reduced premium. Swiss cost-sharing, par-
ticularly in the form of deductibles, is high by international standards. 
Aside from premium variations based on choice of deductibles, insurers are al-
lowed to vary basic premiums only by age group (0–18, 19–25, 26 and older) and  
geography. Cantons provide income-based assistance with premiums; the method varies 
by canton. 
There is a risk equalization system that redistributes premium revenue among in-
surers according to the age and gender mix of their enrollees. As these factors do not ad-
equately predict health spending, premiums can vary widely by the risk-mix of enrolled 
populations, and insurers have the opportunity to benefit from risk selection. As of Janu-
ary 2012 the risk formula will take account of hospital or nursing home stays of more 
than three days in the previous year.
Except for the managed care plans, insurers may not selectively contract with 
providers. Payment rates are negotiated by associations of providers and insurers at the 
canton level, with cantons participating for inpatient care. Cantons also play a significant 
role in inpatient financing and in planning and regulating health care supply. Among the 
consequences of such decentralization are inefficiency and duplication of services.
The Dutch System
Until 2006, the Netherlands had a health insurance system similar to the current German 
system. Most of the population was enrolled in nonprofit “sickness funds” financed 
through fixed-income–based contributions; higher-income people bought private 
insurance. The new Health Insurance Act has replaced this two-tier system with a single 
system in which all residents are required to obtain basic coverage from a private insurer, 
3which may be for-profit or nonprofit, including insurers that previously operated as 
sickness funds. 
National benefit standards specify a comprehensive basic benefit package for 
acute care, with low cost-sharing. Insurance market rules and oversight, including risk 
equalization funds, seek to focus insurance competition on quality and cost performance 
(value) and limit opportunities to gain or lose by health risk selection. 
Insurers must accept all applicants during an annual open-enrollment period. In-
surance premiums are community-rated: variations by age, sex, or health status are pro-
hibited. Insurers may offer one or both of two types of basic health coverage: “in kind,” 
under which the insurer provides care through contracting providers, and “reimburse-
ment,” under which the enrollee purchases care from any qualified provider and is reim-
bursed by the insurer. Although selective contracting is permissible, in practice all Dutch 
enrollees in both in kind and reimbursement plans generally have access to all providers. 
Most of the Dutch (90 percent or more) purchase supplementary insurance that covers 
some services omitted from the basic package, such as adult dental care.
Insurance financing has two basic components. First, all residents pay income-
based contributions into a national insurance pool to finance risk-based premium alloca-
tions. This is a fixed 6.5 percent of income, regardless of the insurance plan chosen. Em-
ployers must pay this amount on behalf of workers; the self-employed and nonworkers 
pay it on their own. Second, enrollees pay a flat premium for each adult directly to their 
insurer. Children are enrolled free of charge and paid for from public funds. 
Each insurer sets its own premium, which may not vary by enrollee, health status, 
or other characteristics. Insurers may offer up to a 10 percent discount to people enrolled 
through collective contracts, such as employer groups. The income-based premium cov-
ers about 50 percent of total spending, and the flat premium another 45 percent; the re-
mainder is paid into the insurance fund by the government using general revenues to cov-
er children (VWS 2006). Lower-income residents receive a health care allowance to help 
pay the flat premium from a national premium credit system. An estimated 40 percent of 
households qualify for such assistance. 
Although selective contracting by insurers is permitted, there are several limits. 
First, the rules stipulate that restrictions on the use of services of non-contracting provid-
ers may not be excessive; this means that PPO-like arrangements may be feasible, but not 
fully integrated systems. Second, insurers can so far negotiate prices only for a limited 
range of inpatient or specialized services. Selective contracting is expected to increase as 
more services become subject to negotiated prices.
4ENFORCEMENT OF MANDATORY HEALTH INSURANCE
Both the Netherlands and Switzerland have an individual mandate: all residents are 
required to have basic insurance coverage. In Switzerland, the cantons enforce this policy. 
Available data suggest that the number of people without coverage in both countries is 
very low. In addition, a small percentage of the insured population is failing to make 
required premium payments—a policy concern in both countries.
Switzerland 
The Swiss system insurance mandate and insurance markets operate through the 26 
cantons. Cantons have adopted a variety of measures to enforce coverage. 
Premium subsidies are provided through the income tax system. Tax data can be 
compared to enrollment information from insurers to identify individuals without cover-
age. An estimated 40 percent of all Swiss households and one-third of the population 
receive such premium assistance. In some cantons this share exceeds 50 percent (BAG 
2007). Individuals who are in need of medical care and are without insurance coverage 
may be assigned to an insurer by the canton or the community of residence. Immigrants 
must prove health insurance coverage when they present themselves at the registry office 
of the community. Once an individual is enrolled with an insurance company, the insurer 
must continue enrollment until there is clear evidence that he or she has changed insur-
ance or is no longer obliged to be insured.
There is no systematic matching of resident and insurance data; proposals to begin 
such matching in some cantons have raised privacy concerns. Still, the number of unin-
sured seems to be very low. In the Canton of Zurich, for example, with 1.2 million in-
sured people, only about 1,200 people per year were found by the canton to lack coverage 
from 1998 to 2000. Of these, 30 percent to 40 percent could subsequently prove that they 
were already insured (BSV 2001), indicating that the share of uninsured is below 1 per-
cent. Some cantons even question whether the control mechanisms in place make sense, 
given the low number of uninsured.
On the other hand, some people who are nominally covered are not paying their 
premiums. Since 2005, insurers have been permitted to suspend payments on behalf of 
such people, meaning that providers are left with unpaid bills or consumers are denied 
services. These suspensions can last 8 to 24 months, because of the time it can take to as-
certain whether a consumer is unable to pay the premium (in which case cantons or com-
munities will often assume financial responsibility) or is simply unwilling to pay. About 
120,000 people, or 1.6 percent of the population, were affected by suspensions in 2006 
(GDK 2007). These suspensions will be eliminated as of January 2009 with the cantons 
taking over 85 percent and the insurers 15 percent of these bills.
5Netherlands 
As noted earlier, financing of basic coverage has two components: the income-related 
contribution paid through the income tax system and the flat premium paid directly to 
the insurer. Some people have failed to enroll in an insurance plan, even though they are 
paying part of the cost through the tax system. Others are enrolled but are failing to make 
their flat premium payments.
Before the new Health Insurance Act, there was a fear that, despite the mandate, 
many individuals would opt not to obtain coverage. In fact, the number of uninsured at 
the end of 2006 was about the same as before the new mandate took effect—241,000 peo-
ple, or 1.5 percent of the population. Of these, 131,000 are immigrants or their children. 
Some 40,000 children are uninsured, even though they can be covered for free; about 
half the uninsured are between 20 and 40 years old. The number of uninsured dropped to 
231,000 at the end of 2007 (CBS 2006, 2007). Policies to identify the uninsured will be 
intensified and imposition of fines will be implemented.
Almost an equal number of people—240,000 as of the end of 2007—were en-
rolled with an insurer but were not paying their premiums. Beginning July 1, 2007, in-
surers were allowed to expel enrollees who have not paid premiums, but these enrollees 
simply switched to other insurers and failed to pay them as well. To prevent this, the 
government has forbidden people from switching plans when they are behind in paying 
their premiums. There is also a proposal to allow garnishing of wages or unemployment 
or disability benefits.
bASIC bENEFIT PACKAGE
Defining the scope of services under a basic benefit package is a key element in systems 
that rely on mandatory health insurance. Setting basic benefits requires balancing the two 
goals of assuring population health and budgetary control. In many European countries, 
this basic benefit package is defined in more or less detail at a national level, with 
changes made over time by an agency using health technology assessment procedures. In 
Switzerland and the Netherlands, systematic evaluation has so far been applied to only a 
few service categories. 
Switzerland
The scope of covered health services under basic insurance is broad compared with other 
OECD countries, including nearly all treatment and diagnostic services for illness, accident, 
and maternity; a few services are explicitly excluded because they are not considered  
effective. Not included is dental care, while long-term care is only partly covered. These 
two items are mainly responsible for the high share of out-of-pocket financing. In theory, 
covered services must meet three criteria: (a) effectiveness, demonstrated through con-
6trolled clinical studies; (b) appropriateness, meaning that the service produces better out-
comes than alternatives; and (c) efficiency, a better cost-benefit ratio than available alter-
natives. Application of these principles, generally by the Commission on General Health 
Insurance Benefits, differs for curative services on the one hand and drugs or preventive 
services on the other. 
The basic benefit package covers all physician services with the exception of 
those explicitly mentioned on a negative list. New technologies are often covered simply 
because they are prescribed by doctors or furnished by authorized providers and rarely 
receive a formal evaluation. In contrast, pharmaceuticals, alternative medicine, and some 
prevention and screening measures are covered only when registered on a positive list 
after a systematic evaluation. These evaluations are ordinarily commissioned by the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, medical society, or other entity seeking coverage. In this 
respect, Switzerland differs from the Netherlands and some other countries, where studies 
are commonly commissioned by the agency responsible for coverage decisions. 
Netherlands
The basic benefits in the Netherlands covered under the Health Insurance Act are also 
broad in scope. Basic benefits focus on curative services. Long-term care and selected 
preventive care and high-risk prenatal services are covered under the AWBZ (the 
separate program that also covers long-term care). As in Switzerland, basic insurance for 
physician and hospital care generally covers all services determined to be appropriate 
under usual professional practice; there is a small negative list of excluded services. 
Formal technological assessment has been confined to pharmaceutical services or to 
new public health measures, such as national screening programs. However, the Health 
Care Insurance Board, which has already used criteria of necessity, effectiveness, and 
efficiency to produce a positive list of pharmaceuticals that are reimbursed, has now been 
given the responsibility of performing a similar task for all specialist care.
COST-SHARING bY PATIENTS 
Basic benefits in Switzerland and the Netherlands differ notably in the extent of patient 
cost-sharing. The Netherlands, in general, has low deductibles and minimal other patient 
cost-sharing. Switzerland has much higher deductibles and coinsurance. This is another 
reason why its share of out-of-pocket costs for medical care is high by international 
standards outside the United States. 
Switzerland
In Switzerland, basic health insurance has a minimum annual deductible of 300 CHF 
(Swiss franc; $255) per year. Consumers can obtain a lower premium by choosing a 
7higher deductible, up to a maximum of 2,500 CHF ($2,125). Once the deductible is 
met, enrollees pay 10 percent coinsurance for services. Coinsurance can be 20 percent 
for a brand-name drug for which a generic substitute is available, unless the physician 
specifically prescribes the brand-name drug. There is a maximum out-of-pocket of 
700 CHF ($595) per year for such patient coinsurance. There is also a nominal daily 
copayment for inpatient care. 
People choosing higher deductibles use fewer services than those opting for the 
minimum deductible (Manning and Zweifel, 2000). There are two possible explanations. 
One is the deterrent effect of cost-sharing. The other is self-selection: people expect-
ing to use fewer services choose the higher deductible. This may be especially easy in 
Switzerland because people can change their deductible level from year to year. So an 
enrollee could, for example, defer elective surgery until after he or she switches to a lower-
deductible plan. Studies have shown that both factors are at work in Switzerland, with 
self-selection accounting for between half and five-sixths of spending differences in the 
different deductible plans (Gerfin and Schellhorn, 2006; Gardiol et al. 2003).
Netherlands
The Netherlands has historically had minimal cost-sharing—with exemptions for primary 
care and essential medications. In its first two years, the basic health insurance program 
had two different mechanisms for making consumers cost-conscious in their use of 
services. The first was a voluntary deductible: enrollees could opt for a deductible of 100, 
200, 300, 400, or 500 Euros in return for a reduced monthly premium. Only 4 percent of 
enrollees chose a plan with a deductible in 2006. The second was a “no claim rebate”: 
enrollees with annual claims less than €255 ($327) received at the end of the year a bonus 
equal to the difference between that amount and their total claims. (To assure access to 
care, general practitioner (GP) and maternity care visits were not counted in calculating 
the rebate.) The rebate appears to have had little effect on consumer behavior (Goudriaan 
et al. 2006). 
As of 2008, the “no claim rebate” has been eliminated and replaced by a manda-
tory minimum deductible of €150 ($192). Adults continue to have the option to go higher 
but few have chosen to do so. Primary care is exempt from the deductible, and other cost-
sharing is minimal. As mentioned above, the Netherlands also has a comprehensive social 
insurance program for long-term care. As a result, Dutch out-of-pocket spending as a 
share of national health spending is relatively low by international standards. (See Figure 
5 in appendix.) 
Although still in early stages, Dutch insurance law reforms seek to enable plans to 
use selective contracting or pricing differentials rather than across-the-board cost-sharing 
to slow cost growth and improve care outcomes.
8THE MARKET FOR bASIC HEALTH INSURANCE
The market for health insurance and regulated oversight of this market play a prominent 
role in the health care systems of both countries. The recent Dutch health care reforms are 
explicitly based on Alain Enthoven’s model of managed competition (Enthoven 1978). In 
the Enthoven model, competing insurers offer a standard benefit package, while annual 
open enrollment ensures consumer mobility. Consumers choose each year from among 
available insurers, on the basis of factors including customer service and health care 
quality as well as premiums. 
To a varying extent, both countries look to vigorous competition among insurers 
as a mechanism and precondition for improving health system performance, including 
improving outcomes and slowing the rate of cost increases. This competition depends  
on readily available information about quality and premiums, benefit packages that are 
homogeneous or easy to compare, and low costs for switching from one plan to another. 
This section assesses the performance and the intensity of competition in the 
Swiss and Dutch health insurance markets, focusing on five key aspects: 
Regulation of benefit packages and open enrollment, which is likely to affect • 
consumer mobility as well as competition between insurers;
Market structure and the vigor of competition in the insurance market;• 
Ease of insurer entry or exit from the market; • 
Switching costs for consumers, including information costs, administrative • 
burdens, and the interrelationship between basic and supplementary insurance; 
and
The objectives pursued by insurers in the context of each market.• 
Switzerland
Regulation. Mandatory basic health insurance is regulated by the Federal Office of Public 
Health (FOPH). (Supplementary insurance, which may be offered both by basic health 
insurers and by other insurance companies, is separately regulated by the Federal Office 
of Private Insurance.) All basic insurers must offer the same benefit package. Enrollees 
can change their insurer at least annually during an open-enrollment period. During 
this period, insurers must accept all applicants. Insurers quote premiums for regions 
established by the FOPH. There may be up to three regions per canton. In each region, 
an insurer’s premiums may vary only by age category (0–18, 19–25, 26 and older) and 
the level of the deductible selected by the enrollee. Internet premium sites make it easy to 
compare the prices of all insurers.
9Market structure. Each of the 7.5 million Swiss residents required to purchase 
basic health insurance is covered under an individual contract; policies do not cover de-
pendents, and there is no group coverage. The demand side, then, is highly fragmented. 
On the supply side, the number of insurers offering basic insurance has declined continu-
ously since the implementation of the Health Insurance Law, from 145 in 1996 to 85 in 
2005 (BAG 2007). Because not all of these operate nationally, no canton has more than 
65 operating insurers. Even this figure is somewhat deceptive, because it counts as sepa-
rate units some subsidiaries within conglomerates operated by large insurance companies. 
The subsidiaries, set up mainly for the reason of risk selection, started with few members 
but are growing quickly. Taking into account all subsidiaries, the largest insurers have 
been gaining enrollment in recent years. Recent estimates suggest the top 10 insurer con-
glomerates account for 80 percent of enrollment. Furthermore, between 1996 and 2005 
only three of the twelve biggest insurers have lost market share whereas nine have grown. 
Groupe Mutuel, with 13 subsidiaries in 2005, has more than doubled in size and is the 
third biggest insurer today (BAG 2007). 
Market entry. All insurers offering basic health insurance must be nonprofit. This 
requirement means that a commercial insurer wishing to offer basic coverage would have 
to split its basic and supplementary health insurance business. Since the implementation 
of the Health Insurance Law, no company from another line of insurance business has ap-
plied to offer basic health insurance; new market entrants were exclusively subsidiaries of 
firms already operating in the market. In addition, Winterthur, the only supplier that has a 
lot of experience in other insurance markets, has left the basic health insurance market. 
Switching costs. Switching costs in the market for basic health insurance consist 
mainly of information costs, administrative burdens, and costs resulting from the inter-
relationship between basic and supplementary insurance. For most consumers, informa-
tion costs are low thanks to Internet comparison sites, media, and services of the federal 
administration. Administrative burdens in canceling old basic coverage and applying for 
new coverage are limited by standardized forms. More important barriers to switching 
plans are faced by people with supplementary health insurance. 
Basic and supplementary insurance are legally separated and can be obtained from 
two or more insurers. However, many consumers prefer for practical reasons to buy both 
policies from one company. Unlike basic insurers, providers of supplementary insurance 
can offer varying benefit packages, obtain information about applicants’ health condi-
tions, and refuse enrollment or vary premiums on the basis of health information. Re-
sulting difficulties in changing supplementary coverage may deter many enrollees from 
switching basic coverage as well.
Objectives of the insurers. Basic health insurers may not make a profit; any sur-
plus must be used to build reserves. While most of the small insurance companies are 
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nonprofit, many of the large insurers are split into a for-profit company, offering supple-
mentary health insurance, and a nonprofit basic health insurance company. There may 
be synergies between the two lines—for example, in provider relations—and some in-
surers may use health information from basic coverage when deciding to whom to offer 
supplementary insurance (this is illegal but difficult to control). Insurers may also wish 
to increase their basic health enrollment to achieve economies of scale or improved risk 
spreading. Finally, some expect that there will be market consolidation if, in the future, 
selective contracting with providers is permitted (see the section below on managed care).
Netherlands
Regulation. As in Switzerland, insurers providing basic health coverage must accept all 
applicants during an annual open-enrollment period. Each insurer must offer community-
rated premiums. Unlike in Switzerland there is no variation by geographic region or 
enrollee age. However, an insurer may set separate premium levels for different enrollee-
selected deductible levels and for different basic coverage models (in-kind vs. reimburse-
ment). The Netherlands also allows for discounts for collective insurance contracts (or 
group contracts, often through employers) of up to 10 percent. The popularity of such 
collective contracts is increasing; about 57 percent of all insured were insured through 
some collective contract by 2007, double the share at the start of reforms (NZA 2007). 
The majority of these are through employer groups (77% of collective contracts). 
Market structure. Insurers compete nationally, rather than regionally as in Swit-
zerland. Competition is fierce; most insurers are offering premiums below actual costs, 
for an estimated aggregate loss of some €600 million ($768 million) in the basic coverage 
market in 2007 (ATOS 2007). Insurers are also competing on non-price factors, such as 
specific services (e.g., high-quality diabetes care) or better comparative information about 
the quality of providers. The market is highly concentrated, with the five largest conglom-
erates (sometimes including more than one company and brand) covering about 82 per-
cent of all insured (Vektis 2007). Concentration has increased since the 2006 reforms. 
Market entry. Market entry is, in principle, easier than in Switzerland, because 
for-profit as well as nonprofit organizations may offer basic coverage. In practice, there 
were no new entrants in 2006, and entry appears to have been difficult before reforms. 
Only seven newcomers entered the market during the 1990s. Two of these have since 
been taken over by existing firms; two left the market before 2002; the remainder had a 
combined 2002 market share of 1.5 percent (Pomp et al. 2005). Insurance efficiency and 
returns to scale appear to have driven market consolidation. 
Switching costs. The Netherlands seeks to facilitate comparison of plans through 
Web sites, as well as standardized benefits and removing barriers to switching coverage. 
As in Switzerland, switching plans entails some information and administrative costs 
11
and is complicated by the split between basic and supplementary coverage. If an enrollee 
changes basic plans, the new carrier must accept the enrollee for basic coverage but is 
not required to offer supplementary coverage. To limit the barrier this presents to plan-
switching, the Health Insurance Act requires that the enrollee’s previous carrier continue 
to provide supplementary coverage at the same rate that would apply if the enrollee had 
continued basic coverage with that carrier. 
Objectives of the insurers. Both for-profit insurers and nonprofit organizations 
offer basic coverage. Currently, there is fierce price competition: most insurers are ac-
cepting losses, apparently in the hope of gaining market share and market power over the 
long term. As reforms enable insurers to negotiate prices and establish innovative pay-
ment arrangements, competition has focused on reputation, keeping premium variations 
in a low range, and building leverage with providers. 
PREMIUM DIFFERENCES
In both countries, premium differences exist among insurers for the same basic benefit 
package and the same type of insurance contract. Large regional differences prevail in 
Switzerland. In the Netherlands, premiums vary within a narrower range but allow for 
differences between collective and individual contracts. 
Switzerland
Premium differences among insurers. Figure 1 shows that, 10 years after implementation 
of the Health Insurance Law, there are huge differences in the premiums charged by 
insurers for the same coverage and region. For the year 2005, for example, the difference 
between the lowest and highest premium for coverage in Zurich with a 300 CHF ($255) 
deductible is 89 percent (BAG 2007). This situation can only persist over time because, 
despite periodic open enrollment, relatively few individuals change insurer from year 
to year. Nearly all the difference in premiums appears to be attributable to risk selection 
not adequately compensated for in the risk equalization system. While there might be 
some differences in insurers’ efficiency, organizations other than managed care plans 
pay uniform provider prices negotiated by associations of insurers and suppliers. 
Administrative costs are small, running about 5 percent of premiums (administrative and 
net earnings), leaving little potential for savings (BAG 2007).
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Figure 1. Range of Monthly Premiums of Basic Health Insurance in 
Major Swiss Cities, 2007 (300 CHF; $255 Deductible)
Note: The box contains the middle 50 percent of all premiums offered, with the median shown by the horizontal line 
within the box. Lines above and below the box indicate the lower and upper quartile of premiums; points outside 
these lines are considered to be outliers.
Source: BAG (2006) Gesamtverzeichnis aller Prämien in der Schweiz.
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Regional premium differences. Regional premium differences within Switzerland 
are permitted to prevent redistribution among regions. This is viewed as appropriate in 
part because cantons have the responsibility for hospital planning, and hospitals are a 
major cost factor. Premiums in the most costly canton, Geneva, are about twice as high as 
in the least costly canton. There have also been differences in rates of premium growth, 
from 36 percent in the Canton Vaud to 69 percent in the Canton Aargau during 1996 to 
2005. As Figure 2 shows, there is a high positive correlation between physician density in 
cantons and the premium level; this may reflect physician-induced demand in some can-
tons or capacity constraints. The correlation between hospital bed density and premiums 
is also positive but lower. 
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Figure 2. Correlation Between Premium Level and 
Physician Density/Hospital Bed Density
Source: BfS Krankenhausstatistik 2005, Table D1.
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Except for a few small carriers that operate primarily within only one region, insurers in 
the Netherlands charge national rates. Premiums vary chiefly by the coverage model— 
in-kind versus reimbursement—and between individual and collective coverage. 
(Insurers also charge different premiums for different deductible levels. Prior to 2008, 
however, the vast majority of enrollees selected a zero-deductible plan.) For individual 
contracts, premiums in 2007 ranged from €1,056 to €1,224 ($1,352–$1,568), with most 
in the narrow range of €1,125 to €1,180 ($1,441–$1,511) per year (Vektis 2007). In-kind 
policies tend to be less costly, and differences by coverage model are likely to increase as 
insurers gain greater flexibility to engage in selective contracting. 
As noted earlier, insurers can offer a discount of up to 10 percent for collective 
contracts. The average premium for collective contracts was about 7 percent lower than 
the average for individual contracts in 2007. Insurers with lower premiums for collective 
contracts seem to be gaining market share more rapidly; no similar phenomenon appears 
in the case of individual coverage.
14
MObILITY OF CONSUMERS 
Consumer mobility—the opportunity to switch from one insurer to another—is central 
to the concept of competition in health insurance. Based on recent trends, markets have 
been quite stable in both countries, with only a small percent of the population changing 
insurers each year. 
Switzerland
Despite the large differences in insurers’ premiums, only a few individuals take advantage 
of the periodic opportunity to change insurers. One survey reported switching rates 
of between 2.1 percent and 4.8 percent for the period 1997 to 2000 (Colombo 2001). 
Similarly, other countries with free choice of insurer, including Belgium, Germany, 
Israel, and the Netherlands, also report low switching rates. Consumers stay with their 
current plans because of habit or comfort, while switchers mention a high premium or 
a large premium increase. Older and higher-cost consumers, as well as those receiving 
low-income premium subsidies, are less likely to switch, as are those with supplementary 
coverage (Beck 2004). Overall, healthier individuals have greater mobility, perhaps 
because they see premiums as an income reduction with little offsetting benefit.
Netherlands
Consumer mobility was low before the 2006 reforms, partly because differences in 
net amounts paid by consumers were only a small fraction of the actual difference in 
insurers’ premiums. In the first months of 2006, 21 percent of consumers changed plans, 
influenced in part by government information campaigns and insurer marketing. Among 
switchers, 57 percent were attracted by a new insurer’s low premium under a collective 
contract, while 37 percent were dissatisfied with their previous plan (de Jong et al. 2006). 
Switching rates then dropped sharply to 4.5 percent in 2007 and 3.5 percent in 2008 
(NZA 2008). As in Switzerland, there is evidence that younger and healthier enrollees 
were more likely to change plans.
RISK EqUALIzATION
In both systems, insurers must accept all applicants for basic health insurance and cannot 
vary premiums according to individual health risk. If open enrollment is successfully 
enforced, and if mobility of the insured is sufficiently high and independent of health 
status, then the risk level of insurers’ enrolled populations might tend to equal out over 
time. However, if insurers’ reputation for high-quality care, including care for complex 
conditions, attracts a disproportionate share of higher-risk patients, plans could be at 
risk for losses without risk equalization adjustment of revenues. Moreover, if higher-risk 
patients are less mobile than good risks and good risks are more likely to move to lower-
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premium plans with higher cost-sharing, then insurance companies can benefit from 
competition on risk selection rather than care performance. Risk equalization systems 
attempt to solve this problem by shifting revenues among insurers based on underlying 
health risks. 
Switzerland
In Switzerland the risk equalization scheme was established to prevent the discrimination 
against bad risks that was expected to result from the introduction of community rating 
in 1996. The risk formula uses 15 age and two gender categories. Average net claim 
payments for enrollees in each of the 30 cells are compared with average claims for all 
enrollees. Insurers with more enrollees in the lower-risk groups (young adults) contribute 
to the pool, while those with more enrollees in the older adult groups (over age 55) draw 
from it. Equalization is performed separately in each canton and is budget neutral. Total 
amounts transferred reached 1.2 billion CHF in 2005 ($1.0 billion; BAG 2007). There 
are several criticisms of the current scheme. First, age and sex are poor proxies for health 
status/morbidity; the resulting risk classes are heterogeneous, leaving risk selection as 
an attractive option. Second, transfer amounts are established retroactively on the basis 
of insurers’ actual spending for enrollees, meaning that efforts to improve efficiency or 
contain costs can be penalized. To overcome the first problem, a history of hospital or 
nursing home stays of more than three days in the previous year will be added as a risk 
adjuster as of January 2012. Simulations indicate that this should significantly reduce 
insurers’ incentives for risk discrimination.
Risk equalization was initially planned to last only 10 years because it was assumed 
that mobility of consumers would level off risk profiles of insurers over time. As mobility 
was lower than expected and good risks have proved to be more mobile than bad risks, 
risk equalization remains essential. 
Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the risk equalization system is used to distribute the central pool of 
funds created by the income-related contributions for basic coverage paid by individuals 
and/or their employers. Insurance company revenues are adjusted prospectively based on 
enrollment and underlying risk factors. In addition to this prospective revenue adjustment 
system, there is a retrospective settlement that compensates insurers for enrollees with 
very high costs. Annual costs for the highest-cost patients above a threshold are shared, 
with the plan paying 10 percent and pooled funds across carriers paying 90 percent. 
Because these post facto settlements could reduce insurers’ incentives to operate 
efficiently, reforms look to further refine the prospective system to reduce the need for 
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retrospective settlement. The government plans to reduce ex post settlements in the 
coming years. 
The Dutch risk adjustment scheme is relatively sophisticated by international 
standards. It groups enrollees by age, gender, labor force status, and region, as well as 
by 20 pharmaceutical cost groups (based on past drug utilization) and 13 diagnostic cost 
groups (based on past hospital use). As Table 1 shows, use of the pharmacy and diagnos-
tic cost groups significantly improves the system’s ability to predict costs for the most ex-
pensive enrollees. Further refinement is still needed to limit incentives for discrimination 
and support plans that attract a higher-risk group as a result of providing better quality 
and comparable or lower costs. The system has been shown to underpay for individuals 
with complex conditions or characteristics that could be readily identified by insurers—
for example, a history of depression or stomach problems (Prinsze et al. 2005). It may 
also not adequately correct for health differences between enrollees with and without 
higher deductibles. Further refinement of the risk equalization formula in 2008 has led to 
the addition of socioeconomic status as a risk factor, measured as the annual incomes of 
those insured by each plan.
In the Netherlands, there is broad consensus regarding the necessity of an ad-
equate risk equalization system to focus insurer competition on managing total costs and 
improving quality. The flat premiums paid directly by individuals to their insurer should, 
in theory, vary by performance rather than underlying health risks—with the central pool 
making adjustments behind the scenes. If these adjustments are adequate, flat premium 
differences would reflect differences in efficiency or patient service amenities. 
Table 1. Predicted Cost as a Percent of Actual Cost for Highest-Cost  
10 Percent of Individuals Under Different Prediction Models, 1999
Model
Average Predicted Cost 
 in Euros
As Percent of Average 
Actual Cost (€3,433; $4,397))
No adjustment 875 25%
With some demographic factors 1,350 39%
With additional demographic factors 1,443 42%
Pharmacy cost groups (PCG) 1,967 57%
Diagnostic cost groups (DCG) 2,046 60%
PCG and DCG 2,418 70%
Source: Van de Ven et al. 2004; costs do not include fixed hospital costs.
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MANAGED CARE PLANS, GATEKEEPING, AND SELECTIVE CONTRACTING
The Netherlands and Switzerland differ on the role of primary care, insurer’s efforts 
to differentiate payments to providers, and the extent to which insurance plans employ 
selective contracting. 
Switzerland
In Switzerland, about 12 percent of the insured are in one of three types of managed 
care organization: health maintenance organizations (HMOs), independent practice 
associations (IPAs), and fee-for-service plans with gatekeeping provisions. Gatekeeping 
systems, which require enrollees to obtain a referral from their family doctor for specialty 
care, account for two-thirds of managed care enrollment. These plans use few other 
cost-containment measures. HMOs and IPAs are more likely to use prior authorization, 
utilization review, and other methods to influence care.
There are two types of HMOs: staff models, in which physicians are employees, 
and group models, in which a physician group owns the HMO and is paid on a per capita 
basis. An IPA consists of a network of general practitioners who contract with an insurer 
and function as gatekeepers; payment is usually on a fee-for-service basis, although a few 
IPAs are capitated. Patients who use an in-network general practitioner often pay lower 
cost-sharing. HMOs are more likely to achieve savings, with estimated cost reductions 
ranging from 20 percent to 37 percent (Beck et al. 2006; Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004). 
IPAs show much smaller savings, usually in those organizations that capitate physicians.
Managed care enrollment has grown from 1.7 percent of the insured in 1996 to 
12.1 percent in 2005 (BAG 2007). Parliament is considering measures to promote further 
enrollment growth. One option is to allow insurers to lock in enrollees for three years, 
instead of allowing annual enrollment changes. This would prevent enrollees from return-
ing to fee-for-service when they anticipate major expenditures and would give insurers 
more incentive to invest in care management.
Insurers other than managed care plans must pay for basic services provided by 
any licensed provider. Patients have wide choice of providers and may self-refer to spe-
cialists. Plans may not negotiate payment rates individually; instead, they rely on rates 
established by negotiation at the canton level between associations of insurers and pro-
viders. There has been some debate about allowing selective contracting; this may be 
more politically possible for the outpatient sector.
Netherlands
The Netherlands has historically operated with a strong primary care system, with an 
emphasis on primary care’s central role in providing access to comprehensive care. This 
includes requiring primary care referral to specialist care. The 2006 insurance reforms 
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continued this practice. As a result, in the Netherlands, all insurers require that enrollees 
use specialists only on referral from a primary care practice. In addition, primary 
care physicians are paid capitation rates and consultation fees both to assure 24-hour 
coverage and to support a patient education and coordination role. It is expected that 
other mechanisms for managing care and integrating care systems may develop under 
the new rules permitting selective contracting. These reforms are still in transition as 
the Netherlands frees up pricing, hoping that doing so will lead to innovative payment 
schemes that promote high-quality, efficient care. There are a few emerging instances of 
insurers acquiring an interest in providers, such as pharmacies or orthopedic hospitals, 
and one insurer has opened a multidisciplinary health center. While selective contracting 
is now allowed, even “in kind” policies do not currently restrict choice of providers. 
Insurers may be concerned that the concept of provider restrictions is unfamiliar and 
that they would lose market share if they limited provider choice. In a country with a 
relatively limited supply of hospitals and specialized capacity, insurers are also limited 
by requirements that contracting or benefit designs not erect barriers to timely access to 
appropriate care. 
Price negotiation with providers is being introduced gradually. Most recently, the 
Netherlands has developed a new system for hospital inpatient and outpatient specialized 
care services, with groupings priced by diagnosis treatment combinations. This classifica-
tion system, with about 30,000 categories, is much more complex than the widely used 
DRG system and applies to specialist physician care as well as inpatient services. Price 
negotiation between insurers and hospitals was initially restricted to about 10 percent 
of elective spending and is now permitted for less complex, more elective treatments 
accounting for 20 percent of spending. There are plans to expand the list of categories 
subject to negotiation until they account for one-third of hospital spending in 2009. This 
would leave two-thirds of inpatient services, such as acute and intensive care, under a 
fixed price system. The opportunity for “free price” negotiation will be further extended 
in the coming years. For GP services, maximum service prices for consultations (visit, 
phone, and home visits) are fixed, as are capitation rates, but some insurers are beginning 
to negotiate discounts. In addition, some insurers are offering GPs financial incentives for 
cost-effective practices, such as increased prescribing of generic drugs. 
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CONCLUSION
Both the Netherlands and Switzerland have developed a health system featuring universal 
insurance coverage based on individual mandates, consumer choice of health plans, 
and regulated insurance market competition. The two systems employ many similar 
mechanisms to set insurance standards and provide public oversight. Yet, there are also 
notable differences in both the focus of policies and how insurance systems are structured 
and regulated. As the two countries seek to meet population needs and provide access to 
all with improved quality and cost performance, similarities as well as differences offer 
opportunities to learn from evolving experiences. Table 2, below, summarizes many of 
these similarities and differences.
Residents in both countries are required to enroll with a private insurance provider 
in a basic plan offering a regulated package of benefits. In the Netherlands, these plans 
typically operate at a national level while the Swiss insurance system is more decentral-
ized, with plans operating and competing at a regional, canton level. 
In each country, insurance companies compete on cost, and online resources offer 
easy comparison for consumers. Insurers are required to accept all applicants for the basic 
package. To discourage risk selection, a central fund distributes premiums based on a risk 
equalization scheme. In Switzerland, the risk equalization formula is relatively simple, 
accounting only for age and gender. There is widespread agreement that this approach 
fails to adjust adequately for health risk. The formula will be modified substantially as of 
January 2012.
In the Netherlands, the risk equalization scheme is sophisticated and complex, 
with the goal of compensating insurers fairly if plans attract higher health risk popula-
tions and fostering insurance competition based on care system performance. Despite this 
sophistication, Dutch policy leaders see room for improvement and view this feature of 
their system as essential to the long-term success of “managed” competition reforms. 
Both health systems in many respects have been very successful, with positive 
health outcomes and very few uninsured. Such coverage enables broad access with finan-
cial protection for their populations, leading to low disparities. Both systems also enjoy 
wide support among their citizenry (Crivelli, Domenighetti, and Filippini, 2006). 
In many respects, both the Swiss and the Netherlands’ insurance systems are still 
works in progress. Policies are evolving as each nation seeks to address the challenge of 
how to best meet current and future population health needs with high-value, efficient 
care systems. With both countries seeking to provide universal coverage based on regu-
lated competition among private insurance plans, monitoring and comparing their experi-
ences over time offer potential insights and opportunities to learn, as competitive theories 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This appendix compares the performance of the Dutch and Swiss systems to that of the 
United States and of other OECD nations. Most of the comparisons are based on the 2008 
OECD health survey. The data should be interpreted cautiously because definitions of 
variables and methods of data collection may differ across countries. 
Health Expenditures
Figure 3 shows changes over time in health expenditures as a percentage of GDP for 
selected OECD countries. Over the last 25 years, spending as a share of GDP has grown 
much more rapidly in Switzerland than in the Netherlands. Among OECD countries,  
only the United States had higher growth over this period or spent more as a share of 
GDP in 2006. 
Figure 3. Health Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 1980–2006
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Figure 4 presents a somewhat different perspective. In 1980, Switzerland spent 
about 37 percent more per capita than the Netherlands (1,031 vs. 755 USD). The differ-
ence shrank to 27 percent in 2006, suggesting that Dutch costs rose faster. The increase in 
the Swiss health expenditure/GDP ratio, therefore, is partly due to the slow growth of the 
Swiss economy, especially in the 1990s.
Figure 5 shows how health expenditures were financed in the two countries in 
2006. The share being paid by social and private health insurance was 78 percent for the 
Netherlands and 43 percent for Switzerland. (Note that in the Netherlands the share paid 
by social insurance would have risen in 2006, as higher-income residents shifted into the 
new basic coverage system.) The data for Switzerland show relatively high shares of out-
of-pocket payments and government payments outside the social insurance system.
Figure 4. Per Capita Spending, U.S. Dollar Purchasing Power Parity, 1980–2006
Source: OECD 2008 Health Data (June 2008).
Year
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Figure 5. Funding of Health Expenditures in 2006, Percentage by Source









In 1980, estimated life expectancy at birth in both countries was about 76 years. Since 
then, life expectancy has grown much faster in Switzerland, reaching 81.7 years in 2006, 
as compared to 79.8 years in the Netherlands (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Life Expectancy at Birth over Time, 1980–2006
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Figure 7 shows self-assessed health status in representative population surveys 
in three years. In all years, the Swiss were more likely than the Dutch to report that they 
were in good or very good health.
Table 3 shows that infant mortality in both countries is substantially below the 
OECD average. Since 1980, the numbers have decreased, though less sharply than in 
other OECD countries; differences between the two countries are negligible.
Figure 7. Percent of Population with Self-Assessed Good or Very Good Health
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Table 3. Infant Mortality per 1,000 Live Births, 1980–2006
 Netherlands Switzerland United States Germany Mean
1980 8.6 9.1 12.6 12.4 17.9
1985 8 6.9 10.6 9.1 14.2
1990 7.1 6.8 9.2 7 11.0
1995 5.5 5 7.6 5.3 8.4
2000 5.1 4.9 6.9 4.4 6.7
2005 4.9 4.2 6.9 3.9 5.5
2006 4.4 4.4 3.8 5.2
Source OECD Health Data 2008, June 2008.
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Equity in Health and Health Care
A number of recent studies have attempted to measure equity in health, health care 
delivery, and health care financing in different countries.
One approach is to analyze self-reported health status by income level. Though 
higher-income people tend to report better health, the disparities are smaller in Switzer-
land and the Netherlands than in any other European country (Leu and Schellhorn, 2006).
Equity in health care delivery can be measured by comparing the distribution 
of medical utilization (physician visits and inpatient stays) by income with the level of 
utilization that would be expected given population needs. Lower-income people in all 
countries studied use more health services. However, after standardizing for age, gender, 
and health status, one study found that the rich have higher than expected physician utili-
zation in the Netherlands, while the poor have higher than expected utilization in Switzer-
land (van Doorslaer et al. 2000). A more recent study found the poor using more services 
than expected in both countries (van Doorslaer et al. 2006).
Finally, a 1999 study assessed equity in health financing across countries (Wag-
staff et al. 1999). Financing was found to be regressive in both Switzerland and the Neth-
erlands; Switzerland was second only to the United States among the countries studied. 
However, the data used date from the early 1990s and do not reflect significant later 
changes in the financing systems.
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